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Abstract
We develop a model of contests on networks. Each player is “connected” to
a set of contests, and exerts a single effort to increase the probability of winning
each contest to which she is connected. We characterize equilibria under both the
Tullock and all-pay auction contest success functions (CSFs), and show that many
well-known results from the contest literature can be obtained by varying the struc-
ture of the network. We also obtain a new exclusion result: We show that, under
both CSFs, equilibrium total effort may be higher when one player is excluded
from the network. This finding contrasts the existing literature, which limits find-
ings of this sort to the all-pay auction CSF. Our framework has a broad range of
applications, including research and development, advertising, and research funding.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, economists have recognized the importance of understanding how the
structure of interactions affects economic behavior, which has led to the development of
research on networks. The importance of this field of research is unquestionable, due to
the broad applicability of these models in many economically relevant settings; to name
a few: job search and employment dynamics (Calvo´-Armengol and Jackson, 2004; Calvo´-
Armengol, 2004), the provision of public goods (Bramoulle´ and Kranton, 2007; Bramoulle´
et al., 2014), collaboration/research and development (Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez, 2001;
Goyal and Joshi, 2003), and criminal activity (Calvo´-Armengol and Zenou, 2004; Ballester
et al., 2006). Jackson and Zenou (2014) provide a comprehensive overview of the literature
on network games, and emphasize three approaches researchers have taken to study such
games:1 (1) games of strategic complements and substitutes; (2) games with linear best-
replies; and (3) settings with an uncertain pattern of interactions.2 These three approaches
have proved fruitful in allowing researchers to understand how the underlying pattern of
interactions affects behavior.
In this paper, we study a new class of network games: contests on networks. Our
model consists of a set of players and a set of contests, which form a commonly known
bipartite graph (or network).3 Each player competes in contests to which she is connected
by exerting a single effort. A player’s expected payoff depends on her own effort, and the
efforts of her competitors. Contests can be used to model many economically relevant
situations, and there is a vast literature that analyzes individual and aggregate behavior.4
Our interest here is to understand how the pattern of interactions affects behavior.
Our model has a number of interesting applications including, for example, central-
ized R&D decisions by multinational firms (MNFs). Prizes are commonly used tools to
encourage R&D activity,5 and contests can be used to model both explicit R&D contests
or patent races (e.g. Che and Gale, 2003; Baye and Hoppe, 2003). To take advantage of
economies of scale and scope, historically, R&D activity within MNFs has tended to be
1See also Jackson (2008) and Bramoulle´ and Kranton (2016).
2Examples of models with an uncertain pattern of interactions include Jackson and Yariv (2007),
Galeotti et al. (2010)
3A bipartite graph is a graph in which the vertices may be partitioned into two disjoint subsets, and
the edges connect the vertices from these subsets.
4For relevant surveys see Nitzan (1994), Congleton et al. (2008), and Konrad (2009).
5Innovation prizes were a central feature of the Obama Administration’s efforts to stimulate American
innovation as part of the Recovery Act of 2009. From 2010 to 2012, 200 new innovation prizes were offered
by federal agencies in areas ranging from national defense to education. (Source: http://challenge.
gov/about.)
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centralized, and undertaken at the corporate level (Gassmann and Von Zedtwitz, 1999).
In this interpretation, the firm chooses a single level of R&D effort, the benefits of which
are then realized by each branch of the firm. Our model could also be interpreted in the
context of a national advertising campaign by a geographically dispersed franchised firm.
In this context, each firm chooses a level of expenditure on a national advertising cam-
paign, which increases the share of the market each franchise expects to capture. Finally,
one might also interpret our model in the context of research funding. In this setting,
researchers exert effort on a project proposal, which they then submit to various funding
agencies to increase their chances of receiving funding for their project.
The main contributions of this research are twofold. First, we contribute to the litera-
ture on networks by analyzing a new class of network games. We characterize equilibrium
behavior in terms of the underlying network characteristics, and study how these char-
acteristics influence behavior. Second, we contribute to the literature on contests by
establishing connections between several important observations in the contest literature,
and different network structures in our setting. That is, we provide a unified framework,
within which many well-known results in the contest literature can be obtained by simply
varying the structure of the network. We also explore how equilibrium behavior depends
on the contest success function (CSF), focusing on the two most widely used CSFs in the
contest literature – the Tullock CSF, and the all-pay auction (APA) CSF.6
We show that the equilibrium behavior in symmetric contests7 – a contest in which
players compete for a single prize of common value – is analogous to equilibrium behavior
(for both CSFs) in our model, when the network is biregular.8 We also show that equi-
librium behavior depends only on player and prize degrees, and is independent from the
number of players and the number of prizes. Consistent with well-known results, when
the network is biregular, total equilibrium effort is always higher under the APA CSF
than under the Tullock CSF.
We then show that equilibrium behavior in 2-player asymmetric contests9 is akin to
equilibrium behavior in our setting, when the network structure is a star.10 In particular,
6Comparisons between Tullock’s CSF and the APA CSF are common in the literature. See, for
example, Hillman and Riley (1989) or Fang (2002).
7See Tullock (1980) and Baye et al. (1996) for the characterization of equilibrium in symmetric contests
with a single prize.
8A bipartite network, g, is biregular if each pair of nodes in the disjoint subsets of g have the same
degree.
9See Hillman and Riley (1989), Baye et al. (1996), Nti (1999, 2004), Stein (2002), and Matros (2006)
for the characterization of equilibrium in asymmetric contests.
10A star network consists of a single “central player”, M ≥ 1 “periphery players” and M prizes. The
central player competes for all M prizes, while each periphery player competes for exactly one prize.
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the central player behaves as if she is competing in a two-player contest in which she
has a higher value for the prize, while each periphery player behaves as-if competing
in a two-player contest in which she has a lower value for the prize. For star networks
under the Tullock CSF, total equilibrium effort is not monotonic in the level of noise
in the CSF (i.e., Tullock’s sensitivity parameter, r). This observation closely relates to
Nti’s (2004) result for two-player asymmetric contests. Moreover, under Tullock’s CSF,
the equilibrium effort of the central player is increasing in the number of prizes (and
periphery players), while for the APA CSF, the central player’s equilibrium strategy is
independent from the number of prizes, and periphery players. Finally, we show that
equilibrium effort may be higher under Tullock’s CSF, than under the APA CSF.
One of the most striking observations in the contest literature is the Exclusion Prin-
ciple, first introduced by Baye et al. (1993). The Exclusion Principle states that total
equilibrium effort may increase if the most competitive (the highest value) player is ex-
cluded from the contest. It is a common finding in the contest literature that the Exclusion
Principle holds only under the APA CSF, and does not apply to the Tullock CSF (see,
for example, Fang, 2002; Matros, 2006; Menicucci, 2006). Intuitively, excluding the
high-value player has two competing effects on equilibrium total effort. There is a direct
effect: excluding this player decreases total effort, due to the loss of this his contribution.
But there is also an indirect effect: the presence of a high-value player may have a “dis-
couragement effect” on less competitive players. Excluding the high-value player “levels
the playing field”, which results in a more competitive contest, and leads the remaining
players to exert higher effort. Prior results have found that the first effect always domi-
nates the second under the Tullock CSF. The reason is that the Tullock CSF introduces
a significant amount of noise in determining the outcome of the contest, as compared to
the APA CSF. As a result, competition is softer, and the discouragement effect is less
pronounced. In this paper, we derive a new exclusion principle, given in terms of network
structures. Our result under the APA CSF nests the results of Baye et al. (1993), but
we provide conditions on the network, under which our exclusion principle also applies to
the Tullock CSF.
We are the first to study contests as a game on networks. Other studies of contests
and networks have different angles. Franke and O¨ztu¨rk (2015) study bilateral conflicts in
which players may compete for several prizes and each player chooses a vector of efforts.
Ko¨nig et al. (2015) studies a setting in which players, competing for a single prize, are
linked as enemies or allies via a network structure. Kovenock and Roberson (2015) study
the attack and defense of targets, which are connected via a network structure. In this
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model, the attacker’s objective is to disconnect the network, while the defender’s objective
is to maintain network connectivity. Marinucci and Vergote (2011) and Grandjean et al.
(2016) study a model of network formation in an all-pay auction,11 and a Tullock contest,
respectively. In these models, players compete for a single prize, but the value of the prize
to each player depends on the number of links she forms. Dahm and Esteve-Gonzalez
(2014) and Dahm (2017) study contests on a particular network structure, in which all
players compete for a main prize, while a set of disadvantaged players also compete for
an additional prize. Both studies find that the additional prize can be used to level the
playing field, and give some advantage back to the disadvantaged player(s). In this way,
a contest designer may be able to elicit greater total effort by splitting the prize budget
between two separate prizes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in Section
2. In Section 3 we first characterize equilibria under both the Tullock and APA CSFs for
certain network structures of interest. We then show the connection between our results
and the existing contest literature. In Section 4 we study how the underlying network
structure affects behavior. Concluding remarks are given in Section 5.
2 The Model
There are N players, and M contests. The set of players is denotedN = {1,. . . ,N}; the set
of contests is denotedM = {1, . . . ,M}. Each player i is risk neutral and is characterized
by a vector gi ≡ (gi1, . . . , giM) where gim = 1, if player i competes in contest m, and




m∈M gim denote the degree of player i; i.e., d
p
i is the
number of contests in which i competes. Let dcm =
∑
i∈N gim denote the degree of contest
m; i.e., dcm is the number of players that compete in contest m. We assume throughout
that for all m ∈ M, dcm ≥ 2, which ensures that there is at least some competition in
each contest. Associated with each contest is a prize; if player i wins contest m, then
she receives the prize, V > 0. Player i chooses a single effort, xi ∈ R+, to increase her
probability of winning each contest in which she competes.
The network structure can be represented by a bipartite graph - a graph in which the
vertices can be separated into two disjoint subsets, and each edge connects the vertices
from these subsets. In our setting, the two disjoint subsets are the set of players, N , and
the set of contests, M; the edges indicate in which contest(s) each player competes.
11Marinucci and Vergote consider an all-pay auction where players have private values, while we study






















Figure 1: The contest network as a bipartite graph.
Figure 1 illustrates the bipartite structure of the network. In this figure, player 1
competes in two contests (dp1 = 2); players 2 and 3 each compete in three contests (d
p
2 =
dp3 = 3); and 2 players compete in each contest (d
c
m = 2 for each contest m = 1, 2, 3, 4).
The bipartite network structure is summarized by the N ×M biadjacency matrix:
g =

g11 g12 · · · g1M





gN1 gN2 · · · gNM
 .
For the network structure in Figure 1:
g =
1 0 0 11 1 1 0
0 1 1 1
 .
Denote by x = (x1, . . . , xN) the vector of all players’ efforts. For a given network
structure, g, and vector of efforts, x, let pim(x,g) denote the probability that player i
wins contest m. The function, pim(·) is the contest-success function (CSF). Note that
pim(x,g) = 0 if gim = 0. Moreover, we assume that pim depends only on the efforts
allocated to contest m, and does not depend on the outcomes of other contests.
The expected payoff to player i is the sum of the expected payoffs across contests in
in contrast to the private value case, no pure strategy equilibrium exists under complete information.
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pim(x,g)V − xi. (1)
Player i takes the strategies of the other N − 1 players and the network structure as
given, and chooses xi to maximize pii. Before proceeding to the analysis, there are a few
network structures worth mentioning.
Biregular Networks
A bipartite network, g, is biregular if each pair of nodes in the disjoint subsets of g have
the same degree. In our context, this means each player competes in the same number of
contests, and each contest has the same number of participants. We provide the following
definition:
Definition 1. Biregular Network
The bipartite network, g, is biregular if for all contests m,n ∈ M, and all players
i, j ∈ N :








In terms of the biadjacency matrix, for a biregular network the sum across each row
is equal to dp, and the sum down each column is equal to dc. Studying Figure 1, it is
clear that this is not a biregular network; while each contest has 2 participants (so Part
1 of Definition 1 is satisfied, with dc = 2), player 1 competes in 2 contests, while players
2 and 3 each compete in 3 contests; thus, Part 2 of Definition 1 is not satisfied.
A biregular network with N players, M prizes, contest degree, dc, and player degree,
dp, can be summarized by [N, dp;M,dc]. From the degree definitions (and our assumption
that dcm ≥ 2) it follows,
2 ≤ dc ≤ N (2)
and
1 ≤ dp ≤M. (3)
Note that the following link property must hold for biregular networks:
Ndp = Mdc. (4)
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The left-hand side of (4) gives the number of links from players to prizes. The right-hand
side of (4) gives the number of links from prizes to players. Clearly, these numbers must
be the same. Two special cases of biregular networks are complete networks, and circle
networks.12 We provide the following definitions:
Definition 2. Complete Network
A biregular network is complete if dc = N .
Definition 2 says that the biregular network is complete if each contest has N partic-
ipants. Note that the link property (4) implies that in a complete network, each player
competes for all M prizes; i.e., dp = M . This means that there is always a unique com-
plete network for any given N and M . We next define a circle network. Before doing so,
we will need to introduce some additional terminology: A walk is a sequence of nodes,
`1, . . . , `k, where `i ∈ N ∪M, and for each i from 1 to k − 1, `i is linked to `i+1.13 The
length of the walk is equal to the number of links; i.e., k − 1. A path is a walk `1, . . . , `k
such that each pair of nodes is distinct, `i 6= `j, with the possible exception that `1 = `k.
A cycle `1, . . . , `k is a path such that `1 = `k.
Definition 3. Circle Network
A biregular network is a circle if dc = dp = 2, and there is a cycle of length 2N .
In a circle network, each player competes in two contests, and each contest has two
participants (i.e., dp = dc = 2), but no two contests have the same set of participants.
Note that the link property, (4), then implies N = M . Example 1 describes all biregular
networks for the case of N = 3; Figure 2 illustrates the corresponding networks.
Example 1. Suppose that there are N = 3 players.
• If M = 1, then there exists a unique biregular network. In this network, dc = 3 and
dp = 1.
• If M = 2, then there exists a unique biregular network. In this network, dc = 3 and
dp = 2.
• If M = 3, then there exist two biregular networks:
1. A circle network where dc = dp = 2.
2. A complete network where dc = dp = 3.
12Circle networks are also known as cycle graphs or ring networks.
13For instance, if `1 ∈ N , and k is odd then it must be that `k ∈ N . If there is a walk from `1 to `k

















































Figure 3: 3 Examples of symmetric contest networks. Players are represented as hollow nodes and








(b) 3-Player Complete Network
Figure 4
2
Figure 2: Illustration of the four networks described in Example 1. For all four networks, N = 3. Top
left: M = 1, dc = 3, dp = 1; Top right: M = dp = 2, dc = 3; Bottom left: A circle network with M = 3,
dc = dp = 2; Bottom right: A complete network with M = dc = dp = 3.
Star Networks
In a star network there are M contests and N = M + 1 players: M “periphery players”
and 1 “central player”. Each periphery player competes in a single contest, while the
central player competes in all M contests. The winner of each contest receives a prize,
V > 0.
Definition 4. Star Network
Let g be a network such that |M| = M ≥ 2 and |N | = M +1. The network is a star if
(1) each contest k ∈ M has degree 2, i.e., dck = 2; (2) there is a “central player” i∗ ∈ N
that has degree M , i.e., dpi∗ = M ; and (3) each “periphery player” j ∈ N \{i∗} has degree
1, i.e., dpj = 1.
Figure 3 illustrates a star network where M = 5. As a convention, we will label the central
player of a star network as player M + 1; so, the set of periphery players is {1, . . . ,M}.
Hybrid Networks
Finally, we describe hybrid networks. Let g be a biregular network, and, consider adding



















Figure 7: Hybrid Network
3
Figure 3: A star network with M = 5. Players are represented by hollow nodes; contests are represented
by solid nodes.
structure as a σ-hybrid network.14 We provide the following definition:
Definition 5. σ-Hybrid Network
Let g be any biregular network with N players and M prizes. A σ-hybrid network is
the network, g′, formed by adding an additional player to g, who competes for σ ≤ M
prizes. We call g the underlying network of g′. We refer to the players in g, {1, . . . , N},
as the underlying players of g′, and we call the additional player, N + 1, the hybrid player
of g′.
Figure 4 illustrates a 6-hybrid network where the underlying network is a 6-player
circle.
3 A Unified Framework
In this section we show that a number of important results from the contest literature
can be obtained as special cases of our network framework. Section 3.1 sets up the model
under the Tullock CSF, and provides an explicit characterization of equilibrium for certain
network structures of interest. Section 3.2 provides an analogous analysis for the APA
CSF. Section 3.3 unifies our results with the existing literature on contests. All proofs
are contained in the Appendix.


















Figure 7: Hybrid Network
3
Figure 4: A 6-hybrid network. The underlying network is a 6-player circle. Players are represented by
hollow nodes; contests are represented by solid nodes.
3.1 Tullock CSF
We now extend the classical Tullock contest to our network contest environment. Fix a
network structure, g, and let x−i ∈ RN−1+ denote the vector of efforts chosen by all players
other than some player i. If
∑
j∈N gjmxj > 0 for some prize m, then the probability that









The parameter r > 0 measures the sensitivity of the probability of success to players’
effort choices. A higher value of r corresponds to a contest success function that is more
sensitive to players’ efforts. If
∑
j∈N gjmxj = 0 for some contest m, then we assume that
each player linked to m is equally likely to win: pim(·) = gimdcm . Using equation (1), the











Player i takes x−i and g as given and chooses xi ≥ 0 to maximize pii(xi,x−i,g). At
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− 1 = 0. (5)
In a pure-strategy equilibrium in which each player is active (i.e. chooses a strictly
positive effort level), equation (5) is satisfied for each player i.
Characterizing Equilibrium
Equation (5) characterizes equilibrium for general network structures (when all players
are active). We will now provide closed-form expressions for equilibrium efforts for cer-
tain network structures of interest. It will be seen in Section 3.3 that these networks
have interesting connections with the existing contest literature. We will focus on “sym-
metric” equilibria. By symmetric in this context, we mean that symmetric players follow
symmetric strategies.
To begin, suppose that the network is biregular, summarized by [N, dp;M,dc], where


















− 1 = 0. (6)
Applying the properties of biregular networks given in Definition 1 to equation (6),
our first result characterizes the unique symmetric equilibrium of biregular networks.
Lemma 1. Suppose that the network is biregular and summarized by [N, dp;M,dc]. Under
the Tullock CSF there exists a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium if and only if r ≤ dc
dc−1 .






Total equilibrium effort is,




Next, consider a star with M contests. Suppose that each of the M symmetric pe-
riphery players follow symmetric strategies. Let x∗ denote the equilibrium effort of each
periphery player, and let x∗M+1 denote the equilibrium effort of the central player. For
each periphery player, (5) reduces to,
rx∗rx∗r−1M+1
(x∗r + x∗rM+1)2
V = 1. (7)





V − 1 = 0. (8)
Our next result characterizes the unique symmetric equilibrium when the network is a
star.
Lemma 2. Suppose the network is a star with M contests. Under the Tullock CSF there
exists a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium if and only if rM r ≤M r +1. The symmetric
equilibrium is unique, and effort for each periphery player is,
x∗ =
rM r
(M r + 1)2
V.
The effort of the central player is x∗M+1 = Mx
∗. Total equilibrium effort is,
X∗ = Mx∗ + x∗M+1 =
2rM r+1
(M r + 1)2
V. (9)
Finally, consider a σ-hybrid network. In contrast to biregular and star networks, for
hybrid networks, there may not exist a symmetric equilibrium in which every player is
active (i.e. exerts strictly positive effort). In particular, unless σ is large enough, there will
always exist a symmetric equilibrium in which the hybrid player is inactive (i.e., exerts
zero effort). We illustrate this finding first via an example, and then we provide a general
result.
Example 2. Suppose the network is a 1-hybrid in which the underlying biregular network
is a 3-player circle. The network structure is illustrated in Figure 5. Note that in any
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symmetric equilibrium, x∗1 = x
∗
3. Under the Tullock CSF with r = 1, it may be verified


























Figure 7: Hybrid Network
3
Figure 5: A 1-hybrid network in which the underlying biregular network is a 3-player circle. Players
are represented by hollow nodes; contests are represented by solid nodes.
Our next result generalizes the finding of Example 2, and shows that, in a 1-hybrid,
there always exists an equilibrium in which the hybrid player is inactive, so long as each
of the other players compete in at least 2 contests.
Lemma 3. Consider a 1-hybrid network, g′, with the underlying network, g, where g is
summarized by [N, dp;M,dc] with dp ≥ 2. Under the Tullock CSF (r = 1) there exists an






Example 2 and Lemma 3 suggest that when an additional player is added to a sym-
metric network, that player must compete in several contests in order to have an incentive
to actively participate. We will next consider the extreme case of M -hybrid networks, in
which the hybrid player competes for all M prizes in the underlying network. Figure 4
illustrates an M -hybrid network in which the underlying network is a 6-player circle.
Lemma 4. Suppose the network is an M-hybrid with an underlying biregular network
summarized by [N, dp;M,dc]. Under the Tullock CSF with r = 1 there exists a unique





The effort of the hybrid player is,
x∗N+1 = (N + 1− dc)x∗.
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Total equilibrium efforts is,
X∗ = Nx∗ + x∗N+1 =




In this section we extend the all-pay auction to our network framework. Under the all-pay
auction CSF, player i wins contest m with certainty if her effort choice is greater than the
effort exerted by the other participants of contest m. In the event that 2 or more players
choose the same highest effort, these players are equally likely to win. Formally:
pim(xi,x−i,g) =

gim, if xi > maxj 6=i{gjmxj},
0, if xi < maxj 6=i{gjmxj},
gim
n
, if i ties with n− 1 others for the highest bid.
It is well-known that the APA with complete information does not possess a pure-
strategy equilibrium. Denote by Fj the CDF of player j’s mixed strategy, and let F−i =
(F1, . . . , Fi−1, Fi+1, . . . , FN) denote the collection of (independent) distribution functions


















Let Si ⊆ R+ denote the support of player i’s mixed strategy. In equilibrium, for each
player i, and each x, x′ ∈ R+,
x, x′ ∈ Si =⇒ pii(x,F−i,g) = pii(x′,F−i,g)
and
x ∈ Si, x′ /∈ Si =⇒ pii(x,F−i,g) ≥ pii(x′,F−i,g)
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Characterizing Equilibrium
We now provide an explicit characterization of equilibrium distribution functions for the
network structures of interest. Before proceeding, note that in a single-prize contest under
the APA CSF there typically exist many equilibria, including a continuum of asymmetric
equilibria when all players have a common prize value (see Baye et al., 1996, henceforth,
BKD). However, there typically exists a unique symmetric equilibrium. In our analysis,
we will focus on “symmetric” equilibria. As in Section 3.1, when we say “symmetric”
in this context, we mean that symmetric players follow symmetric strategies. We now
characterize equilibrium for biregular networks under the APA CSF.
Lemma 5. Suppose the network is biregular. Under the APA CSF there is a unique sym-
metric equilibrium in which each player randomizes continuously on the interval [0, dpV ]













Our next result characterizes the unique symmetric equilibrium for a star network.
Lemma 6. Suppose the network is a star with M contests. Under the APA CSF there
exists a unique symmetric equilibrium in which the central player randomizes uniformly on
[0, V ], while each periphery player places an atom at 0 of size α = M−1
M
, and randomizes








The expected payoff of the central player is (M−1)V . The expected payoff of each periphery
player is zero, and the expected total equilibrium effort is,
X∗ = V.
Next, we consider hybrid networks under the APA CSF. Our first result complements
the finding of Lemma 3, and shows that unless the hybrid player competes in sufficiently
many contests, there always exists a symmetric equilibrium in which she is inactive.
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Lemma 7. Consider a 1-hybrid network, g′, with an underlying network, g, where g is
summarized by [N, dp;M,dc] with dp ≥ 2. Under the APA CSF there exists an equilibrium
in which the hybrid player is inactive, and each underlying player randomizes continuously







Finally, we characterize equilibrium under the APA CSF when the hybrid player com-
petes for all M of the contests.
Lemma 8. Suppose the network is an M-hybrid with an underlying network summarized
by [N, dp;M,dc]. Under the APA CSF there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium in





dc at zero, and randomizes
















The expected payoff of the hybrid player is (M − dp)V . The expected payoff of each
underlying player is zero, and the expected total effort is equal to
X∗ = dpV.
3.3 Unification
In this section, we unify the results of Sections 3.1-3.2 with the existing literature on
contests.
Symmetric Contests
We begin by showing a connection between behavior in single-prize symmetric contests
and behavior in our model when the network structure is biregular.
Theorem 1. Suppose that the network is biregular and the CSF is either the Tullock or
APA. Individual equilibrium behavior and expected payoffs are equivalent to the behavior
17
and expected payoffs in a dc-player contest in which players compete for a single prize with
common value dpV . Total equilibrium effort is equivalent to total equilibrium effort in a
dc-player contest in which players compete for a single prize with common value MV .
Theorem 1 establishes a connection between behavior in the contest played on the
network, and behavior in symmetric single-prize contests, absent network effects. Consider
a biregular network summarized by [N, dp;M,dc]; in this network each of the N players
competes for dp prizes, and each contest has dc participants. Each player thus competes
for a total value of dpV , while the total value of all prizes is MV . Theorem 1 establishes
that each player behaves “as if” competing in a dc-player contest in which each player has
common value dpV , while total equilibrium effort is “as if” dc players each compete for a
prize of common value MV .
To further illustrate this result, consider, for concreteness, the three-player circle illus-
trated in the bottom-left panel of Figure 2. In this network, each player competes in two
contests, and each contest has two participants. In equilibrium, each player behaves as if
competing for a single prize of size 2V against one other player. To see this connection,
first consider a two-player contest with players A and B, who each compete for a single
prize of size 2V , and suppose the CSF is the Tullock. Let x∗ denote the (unique) sym-
metric equilibrium effort level in this game. If player A chooses effort, xA, and B plays
according to equilibrium, xB = x
∗, then the payoff to player A is:













∗rV − xA. (11)
Now, in the 3-player circle network, if Player 1 (say) chooses effort x1, while players 2 and
3 each choose effort, x∗, then the payoff to Player 1 is the sum of the payoffs she receives
from the contest with Player 2 and with Player 3:
pi1(x1, x2 = x

















∗rV − x1. (12)
Clearly, the payoff to player A in equation (11) is the same as the payoff to player 1
given in equation (12). Since, by definition, x∗ maximizes the payoff to A, it must also
maximize Player 1’s payoff. Hence, when Players 2 and 3 choose effort x∗, Player 1’s best
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response is also to choose x∗.15 An analogous symmetry holds under the APA CSF.
It is also worth mentioning that the standard comparative statics results from the
contest literature hold in our setting when the network is biregular. Specifically, for either
the APA or Tullock CSF, expected individual and total equilibrium effort are increasing
in the prize value V . In addition, under the Tullock CSF, individual and total equilibrium
efforts are increasing in the noise parameter, r, and for any r such that a pure strategy
equilibrium exists under the Tullock, expected total effort is higher under the APA than
under the Tullock CSF.
Asymmetric Contests
Our next result establishes a connection between equilibrium behavior in the star network
with equilibrium behavior in 2-player asymmetric contests.
Theorem 2. Suppose the network is a star and the CSF is either the Tullock or APA.
Individual equilibrium behavior and expected payoffs are equivalent to the behavior and
expected payoffs in a 2-player asymmetric contest in which the “weak” player has value, V ,
while the “strong” player has value, MV . Each periphery player behaves as-if competing
as the weak player, while the central player behaves as-if competing as the strong player
in the 2-player contest.
Theorem 2 establishes a close connection between a contest played on a star network
and 2-player asymmetric contests. To see this connection more explicitly, consider a star
network with M contests. Note that the payoff to a periphery player, i, only depends
directly on her own effort and the effort of the central player. So, let pii(x, xM+1) denote
the payoff to player i when she chooses effort x, and the central player, M + 1, chooses




V − x. (13)
The expected payoff to the central player depends on her own effort as well as the efforts
of each periphery player. Suppose the periphery players choose efforts according to x =









15Given the symmetric nature of the network, our choice to examine the payoff of Player 1 was arbitrary;
this same analysis could be applied for players 2, or 3.
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If the periphery players follow symmetric strategies, so that x = (x, . . . , x), then the





MV − xM+1. (14)
Studying expressions (13) and (14) it is clear that, when the periphery players adopt
symmetric strategies, the expected payoff of the central player is equivalent to what
his payoff would be in a two-player Tullock contest in which he has value MV and his
opponent chooses effort, x. Moreover, the expected payoff to each periphery player is
equivalent to what her payoff would be in a two-player contest in which she has value
V . A similar symmetry holds under the APA CSF. Note, however, that total equilibrium
effort on the star is greater than it would be in a 2-player asymmetric contest. This is
clearly the case since, on the star network, there are M ≥ 1 periphery players, each of
whom behaves as they would in the 2-player contest.
As shown in Section 3.1, for biregular networks under the Tullock CSF total equilib-
rium effort is linear and increasing in r. This result is consistent with findings in the
contest literature when players have the same prize values. When the prize values are
different, Nti (1999, 2004) shows that this relationship is less clear, and is generally not
monotonic. We obtain a similar finding in our setting when the network is a star.
In what follows, we restrict attention to values of r that permit the existence of a
symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium. Let rM denote the unique solution to the equation
(rM − 1)M rM = 1. (15)
rM is the highest value of r that supports a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium on a
star with M periphery players (see Lemma 2). Clearly, for any M , rM > 1. Moreover, it
is straightforward to show that rM is strictly decreasing in M , and rM ∈ (1, 2].16
Let X∗M(r) denote total equilibrium effort when there are M periphery players, and
the Tullock CSF parameter is r. Let r∗(M) denote the value of r that maximizes total
equilibrium effort:
r∗(M) = arg max
r∈[0,rM ]
{X∗M(r)}.
Our next proposition reveals that total equilibrium effort is in fact a single-peaked function
16It is well-known that for r ∈ (2,∞) there does not exist a pure-strategy equilibrium under the Tullock
CSF. For such values of r, the mixed-strategy equilibrium shares some common features with equilibrium
under the APA CSF. See, Baye et al. (1994), Alcalde and Dahm (2010), and Ewerhart (2015).
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of r. Moreover, we show that for any fixed r ∈ (0, rM), total equilibrium effort is increasing
in M . That is, as the number of periphery players (and prizes) increases, total equilibrium
effort increases.
Proposition 1. Suppose the network is a star with M ≥ 2 contests, and the CSF is
the Tullock. Equilibrium total effort, X∗M(·), is a single-peaked function, and r∗(·) is a




M r∗(M) − 1 .
Further, r∗(·) is strictly decreasing and limM→∞ r∗(M) = 0. Finally, for any M ≥ 2
and r such that r ∈ (0, rM+1), it holds that X∗M+1(r) > X∗M(r).
We first convey the intuition behind the relationship between equilibrium total effort
and the parameter r. Nti (1999) shows that the fraction of each player’s rent that is
dissipated in equilibrium in the asymmetric two-player Tullock contest is non-monotonic
in r. Drawing on the equivalence between individual equilibrium behavior in Nti’s setting
and our setting, consider the setting studied by Nti. For fixed prize values, when r is close
to zero, the outcome of the contest is largely determined by luck. As a result, players
do not have strong incentives to exert effort. As r increases, the outcome of the contest
depends less on chance, and more on players’ efforts. This provides stronger incentives for
both players to exert effort. However, if the contest is asymmetric enough, as r increases
further, the stronger player – who always exerts more effort than the weaker player –
becomes ever more likely to win the contest. This discourages the weaker player from
exerting effort, which may also mean that the strong player need not exert much effort
in equilibrium. Combining these two effects gives rise to a non-monotonic relationship
between r and total effort.
In our setting, a higher value of M corresponds to a greater degree of asymmetry in
the contest; for M large enough, the value of r that maximizes total effort will be in
the interior of the feasible set; i.e., r∗(M) ∈ (0, rM). As M gets larger, the degree of
asymmetry grows, and the discouragement effect described above is exacerbated. Lower
values of r introduce a greater amount of chance into each contest, which dampens this
effect by reducing the advantage of the stronger player. As a result, r∗(·) is decreasing.
Finally, as M gets large, the only way to prevent complete discouragement of the periphery
players is by choosing r closer to zero, and so r∗(M) approaches zero as M gets large.
It is also interesting to call attention to the dependency on M of total equilibrium
effort (for fixed r). Note that an increase in M affects effort via two distinct channels.
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First, as already discussed, increasing M increases the degree of asymmetry in the contest,
which is akin to increasing the prize value of the strong player in Nti’s (1999) setting.
Nti shows that, ceteris paribus, an increase in the strong player’s prize value increases
his effort, and reduces the effort of the weaker player. The net effect on total effort is
ambiguous. But there’s a second channel in our setting that is absent in Nti’s setting; an
increase in M also increases the number of periphery players. Although the individual
effort of each periphery player decreases, it can be shown that the combined effort of
these M periphery players is increasing in M . The net effect is that an increase in M
unambiguously increases total equilibrium effort under the Tullock CSF.
We next compare the total equilibrium effort on the star under the Tullock and APA
CSFs. Recall that on biregular networks, equilibrium total effort is always greater under
the APA CSF than under the Tullock CSF. Our next result shows that for star networks,
the opposite conclusion may hold.
Proposition 2. Suppose the network is a star with M contests. Fix r = 1, and suppose
that M ≥ 3. Then equilibrium total effort is higher under the Tullock CSF than under the
APA CSF.
The intuition for Proposition 2 closely relates to that of Proposition 1. As shown
in Proposition 1, under the Tullock CSF total equilibrium effort may be decreasing in r
when M is sufficiently large. But the APA CSF is just the limiting case of the Tullock
CSF as r → ∞. As a result, when M is sufficiently large (in this case, M ≥ 3), so that
there is a sufficient degree of asymmetry in the network, the less cutthroat competition
induced under the Tullock generates greater total effort in equilibrium.
The Exclusion Principle
A rather surprising result from the contest literature is the so-called “Exclusion Principal”,
first demonstrated by Baye et al. (1993). The exclusion principal states that, in an asym-
metric contest under the APA CSF, a contest designer may be able to increase expected
total effort by excluding the player with the highest value. Intuitively, the presence of the
high-value player discourages the other players from bidding aggressively. Removing the
high-value player “levels the playing field” and encourages fiercer competition amongst
the remaining players. Fang (2002) shows that the Exclusion Principal does not carry
over to the Tullock CSF. Intuitively, the high level of noise in the Tullock CSF means
that the discouragement effect from having the strong player in the contest is somewhat
mitigated. Leveling the playing field in this case does not stimulate enough effort from
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the remaining players to offset the drop in effort caused by the removal of he high-value
player.
We next explore this idea in our network setting. To do so, we compare the expected
total equilibrium effort on an M -hybrid network, with the total effort of the underlying
network. We obtain an exclusion result akin to that of Baye et al under the APA CSF.
In contrast to Fang’s result, we show that a similar exclusion result also holds under
the Tullock CSF in our setting. Before proceeding, let x(g) denote individual expected
equilibrium effort when the network is g, and let X(g) denote equilibrium expected total
effort.
Theorem 3. Let g′ be an M-hybrid network with an underlying network, g, summarized
by [N, dp;M,dc]. Under the APA CSF, X(g) > X(g′) if and only if N > dc. Under the
Tullock CSF, X(g) > X(g′) if and only if
N >
(dc)2 + 1
dc − 1 . (16)
Theorem 3 establishes that if the network structure is an M -hybrid, then a contest
designer may be able to increase total equilibrium effort by excluding the hybrid player.
Under the APA CSF, this exclusion result holds so long as there is some degree of asym-
metry between the hybrid player and the underlying players in the network, which mirrors
the results of Baye et al. (1993).
Our exclusion result under the Tullock CSF contrasts existing results from the contest
literature (see, e.g., Fang, 2002; Matros, 2006). The condition given in (16) can be
interpreted as requiring a sufficient degree of asymmetry in the hybrid network. To see
this, note that (16) requires that N is sufficiently large, relative to dc. By the link property
of biregular networks, Ndp = Mdc, when N is large, relative to dc it must mean that dp is
small, relative to M . That is, the hybrid player, who competes in M contests, competes
for sufficiently more prizes than each player in the underlying network (each of these
players compete for dp prizes).
The impact on aggregate behavior of adding a or removing a player from a network,
not only depends on that player’s direct contribution, but also depends on indirect effects
that stem from the player’s influence on the structure of interactions (see, e.g. Ballester
et al., 2006). Previous results on the Exclusion Principle in the contest literature mainly
focus on one particular pattern of interactions (one in which all players compete for a
single prize); the addition/removal of one player does not affect this structure.17 When
17Two exceptions are Dahm and Esteve-Gonzalez (2014) and Dahm (2017). Both studies explore a
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indirect network effects are taken into account, our Theorem 3 suggests that the Exclusion
Principle is a more robust phenomenon than previously thought. The following example
illustrates our finding.
Example 3. Suppose g′ is an M-hybrid with an underlying network, g, where g is sum-
marized by [N, dp;M,dc] = [6, 2; 4, 3]. Consider the Tullock CSF with noise parameter
r = 1, and assume V = 1. Under the APA CSF:
X(g) = MV = 4
and,
X(g′) = dpV = 2.

















In this section, we have shown that a number of results from the contest literature can be
obtained by varying the structure of the network in our framework. Table 1 summarizes
these linkages.
particular network structure in which all players compete for a main prize, while a subset of disadvantaged
players also compete for a secondary prize. Dahm (2017) shows that excluding an advantaged player
altogether may increase total effort under the APA CSF, but even greater effort can be generated by only
excluding the advantaged player from competing for the secondary prize.
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Table 1: A Unified Framework
Contest Results and Corresponding Network Structures
Result Related Literature Network Structure
Behavior in
Symmetric Contests





Hillman and Riley (1989), BKD,




Baye et al. (1993), Fang (2002),
Matros (2006), Menicucci (2006)
M-Hybrid Networks
4 Network Structures
In this section, we explore how the underlying network structure affects equilibrium be-
havior. Consider two biregular networks, g1 and g2, each with N players. Summarize




k]. Our interest is in assessing how equilibrium behavior varies
with the network parameters, N, dp,M , or dc. Let Vk denote the prize value associated
with each contest when the network structure is gk. We wish to distinguish the impact
of a change in the network structure from, say, an increase in the total value for which
players compete; so, we assume that the total value of all prizes in each network is the
same: M1V1 = M2V2. Note that since the link property, Nd
p = Mdc, must hold for the
network to be biregular, one can not assess a ceteris paribus change in one of the network
parameters, and simultaneously preserve biregularity. Nevertheless, our next result cap-
tures some sense in which equilibrium behavior is affected by a change to the structure
of the network.
Theorem 4. Let g1 and g2 be two biregular networks with N players, such that the total
value of all prizes in each network is the same: M1V1 = M2V2. Then under the Tullock
CSF, the following four statements are equivalent:
(i) dp1V1 > d
p
2V2
(ii) dc1 > d
c
2
(iii) X(g1) > X(g2)
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(iv) x(g1) > x(g2)
Under the APA CSF, X(g1) = X(g2) and x(g1) = x(g2).
Theorem 4 describes how total and individual equilibrium efforts are affected when
the structure of the network changes, but where the number of players, and the total
value of all prizes in each network is held constant.
To illustrate the result of Theorem 4, consider the two network structures in Figure
6. In each network, there are three players and three prizes. So, if each prize in both
networks is worth V , then the total prize value in each network is 3V . Note that in
the circle network of Figure 6(a), dp = dc = 2; while in the complete network in Figure
6(b) dp = dc = 3. Theorem 4 implies that under the Tullock CSF, the complete network
generates greater individual effort than the circle network. Consider changing the network
structure from the circle network to the complete network. Equilibrium efforts are affected
via two channels. First, in the complete network, each player competes for a greater total
value (3V as compared to 2V ); this effect encourages greater effort from each player.
Second, in the complete network, each player faces more competition in each contest.
Examining the expression for individual effort in Lemma 1, it is clear that an increase
in the number competitors (dc) decreases individual efforts. As it happens, the first
effect always dominates the second effect under the Tullock; hence, the complete network
generates greater total effort than the circle. Under the APA CSF, these two effects
exactly offset one another, leading to the same total and individual expected efforts for
either network structure.
Theorem 4 is also useful for providing insights into the optimal design of networks.
Suppose there are a fixed number of players, N , and a contest designer with a prize budget




























Figure 3: 3 Examples of symmetric contest networks. Players are represented as hollow nodes and








(b) 3-Player Complete Network
Figure 4
2
Figure 6: Two 3-player network structures. Players are represented as hollow nodes; contests are
represented as solid nodes.
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equilibrium efforts. In other words, the designer takes N and B as given, and chooses dp,
M , and dc to maximize total equilibrium effort, subject to the constraints Ndp = Mdc
and MV = B.18 As a straightforward consequence of Theorem 4, under the Tullock CSF,
the designer would be indifferent between any complete network structure. This must be
true since, in general dc ≤ N , and for a complete network structure, dc = N . Part (ii)
of Theorem 4 immediately implies that this network structure would indeed maximize
equilibrium efforts, subject to the aforementioned constraints. The following numerical
example illustrates.
Example 4. Let g be a biregular network where N = 3. Suppose that B = 12 and r = 1.
Denote by X∗ total equilibrium effort under the Tullock CSF.
• If M = 1, there is a unique biregular network, and this network is complete: dp = 1








• If M = 2, there is a unique biregular network, and this network is complete: dp = 2








• If M = 3, then there are two biregular networks:
















Next, suppose the number of prizes is fixed at M , and consider adding a player to
a biregular network, g. The resulting network structure, g′ is thus a σ-hybrid. We
18There is no reason to think that a contest designer should be restricted to only choosing a symmetric
network structure. Yet the purpose of this exercise is to shed light on how the network structure affects
equilibrium behavior.
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have already shown in Lemmas 3 and 7 that, unless σ is sufficiently large, there will
always exist an equilibrium in which the additional player is inactive, and there is no
impact on the behavior of the players in g. Moreover, we showed in Theorem 3 that
if this additional player competes in every contest, and the resulting network structure
is asymmetric enough, then the equilibrium effort of each player in g will decrease, and
total effort in g′ is lower than in g. Finally, consider adding an additional player to a
biregular network in such a way that the biregularity of the network is preserved. Since
the link property, Ndp = Mdc, must hold, it only make sense to answer this question for
complete networks. In a complete network, N = dc. By Lemma 1 it is clear that under
the Tullock CSF, individual equilibrium effort decreases, while total equilibrium effort
increases, following the entry of an additional player. Under the APA CSF, Lemma 5
implies that total expected equilibrium effort is unchanged, and hence individual expected
efforts must fall.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have proposed a framework for studying contests on networks. We
characterized equilibrium in terms of the underlying network structure, and studied how
this structure affects equilibrium behavior. Furthermore, we have shown that a number
of results from the contest literature may be obtained in our framework by varying the
structure of the network. In addition, we have provided a new exclusion result, akin to
Baye et al.’s (1993) Exclusion Principle, but which is relevant under the Tullock CSF.
This result contrasts the existing literature, and highlights the relevance of network effects
in our model.
6 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Let x∗ be as given in the lemma. We will show that x∗ is a best response to x∗−i ≡
(x∗, ..., x∗). Let Γ(xi,x−i) ≡ ∂pii(xi,x−i,g)∂xi . First, we show that Γ(x∗,x∗−i) = 0 and, for
r ≤ dc
dc−1 , the second order condition is satisfied. Finally, we will show that pii(x
∗,x∗−i) > 0.
Since the network is biregular, if player i competes in contest m (so that gim > 0),
then
∑
j 6=i gjm = d
c − 1. If player i does not compete in contest m, then gim = 0. Hence,
28






































− 1 = 0.
To show that x∗ is in fact a best-reply to x∗−i we now show that the second-order
condition is satisfied, and pii(x













(r − 1) dc − 2r
dc
(dc − 1) rMV (x∗)2r−2 < 0 (17)
The SOC given in equation (17) is satisfied if and only if (r− 1)dc − 2r < 0, which holds
if dc = 2. If dc > 2 then (17) holds if and only if r < d
c
dc−2 , which is satisfied under the
condition, r < d
c
dc−1 , given in the lemma. Next, we show that pii(x















dc − r(dc − 1)].
The term in square brackets on the right-hand side (RHS) of the expression above is
positive if and only if r ≤ dc
dc−1 , which establishes that x
∗ is a best-reply to x∗−i.
Now, we show that (x∗, ..., x∗) is the unique symmetric equilibrium. Any symmetric
equilibrium, (x′, . . . , x′), must satisfy Γ(x′,x′−i) = 0. However, it is straightforward to
show that Γ(x, x, . . . , x) is strictly decreasing in x. Hence, there is a unique solution to
Γ(x′,x′−i) = 0, which, as shown, is given by x
∗.
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Proof of Lemma 2
Suppose the network is a star with N periphery players. The first-order condition for each
periphery player i ∈ {1, . . . ,M} is given in equation (7), and the first-order condition for
the central player, M + 1, is given in (8).





Suppose that each periphery player i adopts a symmetric strategy: xi = x. Then (18)
implies that xM+1 = Mx. Using equation (7) it is easily verified that




Next, we confirm that the second-order conditions are satisfied. Note that for a star
network, the payoff to each periphery player only depends directly on the effort of the
central player. So, let pii(x, xM+1) denote the payoff to a periphery player, i, when she
chooses effort, x, and the central player chooses xM+1. It may be verified that the second-





|xi=x∗ < 0, is satisfied if and
only if rM r < M r + 1 + r, which is implied by the condition rM r ≤ M r + 1, given in
the lemma. It may be verified that the second-order condition for the central player is
satisfied for any M ≥ 1.
Finally, we show that pii(x










∗,Mx∗) ≥ 0 if and only if rM r ≤ M r + 1. Note that since each periphery
player earns a non-negative payoff, the central player also earns a non-negative payoff.
Proof of Lemma 3
Let g′ be a 1-hybrid with an underlying network summarized by [N, dp;M,dc]. Assume,
without loss of generality, that the hybrid player, N+1 competes in contest 1. To establish
the lemma, it suffices to show that when each player i ∈ {1, . . . , N} chooses effort x∗,
given in the lemma, then player N + 1 does not have a profitable deviation.
Suppose that each player i ∈ {1, . . . , N} chooses effort x∗. Note that the total effort
expended to each contest by these players is dcx∗ = d
c−1
dc
dpV . Then, see that for any
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dc ≥ 2 and dp ≥ 2 it holds that dcx∗ = dc−1
dc
dpV ≥ V . Suppose player N + 1 chooses effort



















The above inequality is strict if x > 0. Hence, the only best response for player N + 1 is
to choose x = 0.
Proof of Lemma 4
Consider some underlying player i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Suppose that the underlying players
other than i choose efforts according to, x−i = (x, . . . , x), where x > 0, while the hybrid





(dc − 1)x+ xi + xN+1V − xi.






(dc − 1)x+ xN+1
((dc − 1)x+ xi + xN+1)2
gimV − 1 = 0.
In a symmetric equilibrium, each underlying player chooses the same effort, xj = x
∗ for
j ∈ {1, . . . , N}. The first-order condition becomes,
M∑
m=1
(dc − 1)x∗ + xN+1
(dcx∗ + xN+1)
2 gimV =
(g − 1)x∗ + xN+1
(dcx∗ + xN+1)
2 d
pV = 1. (19)







The first order condition is
dcx∗
(dcx∗ + x∗N+1)2
MV = 1. (20)
From (19) and (20), we get
x∗N+1 =
dc(M − dp) + dp
dp
x∗ = (N + 1− dc)x∗. (21)
From (4) and (21),
x∗N+1 = (N + 1− g)x∗. (22)





It is easy to verify that the second-order conditions are satisfied for all players. More-
over, given efforts, xi = x
∗ for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and x∗N+1 = (N + 1− dc)x∗, it is easy to
check that the expected payoffs to all players are positive.
Proof of Lemma 5
First, we show that there is a symmetric equilibrium in which each player chooses their
effort according to the distribution function F ∗ (where F ∗ is given in (10)), with support
[0, dpV ]. Let pii(x, F
∗
−i) denote the payoff to player i from choosing effort x ∈ [0, dpV ]












Since the network is biregular, if gim = 1 for some m then
∑
j 6=i gjm = d
















c−1 (dpV )− x = 0,
Thus, any x ∈ [0, dpV ] is a best response of player i to F ∗−i. Therefore, there exists
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a symmetric equilibrium in which each player randomizes continuously on the interval
[0, dpV ] according to the distribution function given by (10).
The arguments that establish that this is the unique symmetric equilibrium follow
similar arguments to those made by BKD in the proof of their Theorem 1. In particu-
lar, their arguments may be used to establish the following facts about any symmetric
equilibrium:
(i) All players randomize continuously on [0, dpV ], with strictly increasing CDFs over
this interval.
(ii) Each player earns an expected payoff of 0.
The facts above may be used to establish that there is a unique symmetric equilibrium.

















The expected total equilibrium effort is




Proof of Lemma 6
First we show that the strategies described in the lemma constitute an equilibrium. So,
suppose the periphery players, {1, . . . ,M}, bid according to F∗ = (F ∗, . . . , F ∗), where F ∗






F ∗(x)− x = V
(
M − 1 + x
V
)
− x = (M − 1)V.
Hence, the central player is indifferent among all x ∈ [0, V ] and uniform randomization on
[0, V ] is a best-response to F∗. Now suppose the central player bids uniformly on [0, V ];
let G∗ denote this CDF: G∗(x) = x
V
, x ∈ [0, V ]. If periphery player i, chooses effort,






V − x = 0
Hence, F ∗ is a best response for player i.
33
The arguments that establish that this is the unique symmetric equilibrium follow
similar arguments to those made by BKD in the proof of their Theorem 2. In particu-
lar, their arguments may be used to establish the following facts about any symmetric
equilibrium:
(i) The central player randomizes continuously on [0, V ], with a strictly increasing CDF
over this interval.
(ii) The periphery players follow mixed strategies with support in [0, V ] and place no
mass at any x ∈ (0, V ].
(iii) The periphery players randomize continuously on (0, V ], with strictly increasing
CDFs over this interval.
(iv) The expected payoff of the central player is (M − 1)V , while the expected payoff of
each periphery player is 0.
The facts above may then be applied to establish that there is a unique symmetric
equilibrium.
Now, in the symmetric equilibrium, the central player chooses effort uniformly on
[0, V ]; so his expected effort is E[xM+1] =
V
2
. The sum of the expected efforts exerted by
the periphery players is
M∑
i=1




















Proof of Lemma 7
Let g′ be a 1-hybrid with underlying network g summarized by [N, dp;M,dc] with dp ≥ 2.
Let F ∗ be as given in the lemma. It suffices to show that when the underlying players
bid according to F∗ = (F ∗, . . . , F ∗), then the hybrid player’s expected payoff is no greater
than zero: That is, for any x ∈ R+, we will show piN+1(x,F∗,g′) ≤ 0. First note that we
may restrict attention to x ≤ V , as any x > V guarantees the hybrid player a payoff less
than zero. Also note that 0 ≤ x ≤ V < dpV implies F ∗(x) = ( x
dpV
) 1
dc−1 . Thus, we have
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piN+1(x,F



















The first inequality holds since x
dpV
< 1, and d
c
dc−1 > 1. The final inequality holds
since, by assumption, dp ≥ 2, and x ≥ 0.
Proof of Lemma 8
We first show that the strategies given in the lemma constitute a symmetric equilibrium.
Suppose the underlying players, {1, . . . , N}, randomize according to F∗ = (F ∗, . . . , F ∗),
where F ∗ is as given in the lemma. If the hybrid player, N + 1, bids x ∈ [0, dpV ], then






c − x = (M − dp)V .
Therefore, the hybrid player is indifferent among all x ∈ [0, dpV ]. Hence the mixed
strategy outlined in the lemma for the hybrid player is a best response to F∗. Next,
suppose that the underlying players, other than underlying player i, randomize according
to F∗−i = (F
∗, . . . , F ∗) and the hybrid player randomizes according to G∗, where G∗ is as










c−1G∗(x)− x = 0.
Therefore, player i is indifferent among all x ∈ [0, dpV ]. Hence, the mixed strategy
outlined in the lemma for player i is a best response to F∗−i and G
∗.

































Therefore, total expected equilibrium effort is











Where the final equality is obtained by applying the link property (4): Ndp = Mdc.
The arguments that establish that this is the unique symmetric equilibrium follow
similar arguments to those made by BKD in the proof of their Theorem 2. In particu-
lar, their arguments may be used to establish the following facts about any symmetric
equilibrium:
(i) The hybrid player randomizes continuously on [0, dpV ], with a strictly increasing
CDF over this interval.
(ii) The underlying players follow mixed strategies with support in [0, dpV ], and place
no mass at any x ∈ (0, dpV ].
(iii) The underlying players randomize continuously on (0, dpV ], with strictly increasing
CDFs over this interval.
(iv) The expected payoff of the hybrid player is (M − dp)V , while the expected payoff of
each underlying player is 0.
These facts can be used to establish that there is a unique symmetric equilibrium.
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Proof of Theorem 1
For the Tullock CSF: Compare the equilibrium characterized in Lemma 1 with the equi-
librium characterized by Tullock (1980). For the APA CSF: Compare the equilibrium
characterized in Lemma 5 with the symmetric equilibrium characterized by BKD (Theo-
rem 1).
Proof of Theorem 2
For the Tullock CSF: Compare the equilibrium characterized in Lemma 2 with the equi-
librium characterized by Nti (1999). For the APA CSF: Compare the equilibrium charac-
terized in Lemma 6 with the equilibrium characterized by Proposition 2 in Hillman and
Riley (1989) or Theorem 3 in BKD.
Proof of Proposition 1
If r ≤ rM , then by Lemma 2 symmetric equilibrium total effort is
X∗M(r) =
2rM r+1V
(M r + 1)2
.
First, we show that X∗M(r) is a single-peaked function of r. Let M ≥ 2 and note that
∂X∗M(r)
∂r
= (r lnM +M r −M rr lnM + 1) 2M
r+1V




















2(1−M2r) + r ln(M) (M2r − 4M r + 1)] .
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M r∗ − 1
(
M2r






















|r=r∗ < 0, which means that X∗M(r) is a single-peaked
function of r.
We now show that r∗(M) < rM for all M ≥ 4. Since X∗M(r) is a single peaked function
of r, it suffices to show that
∂X∗M (r)
∂r









M rM + 1− rM(M rM − 1) ln(M)
]
. (23)







< 0. For M ≥ 5 we will show that ∂X∗M (r)
∂r
|r=1 < 0. Since rM > 1 for all
M , and X∗M(r) is a single-peaked function of r, if
∂X∗M (r)
∂r












= sign [M + 1− (M − 1) ln(M)]
and
[M + 1− (M − 1) ln(M)] < 0 for M ≥ 5.




M r∗(M) − 1 . (24)
Although M takes on only discrete integer values, for the moment, suppose that M is a
continuous variable. If M is a continuous variable then (24) defines a continuous function
r˜∗(·); we show in this case that dr˜∗(M)
dM
< 0. This finding immediately implies that r∗(·) is
strictly decreasing, as r∗(M) corresponds to the particular points on r˜(M) when M is an







Thus r∗(·) is strictly decreasing.
We now show that limM→∞ r∗(M) = 0. Fix  > 0. We must show r∗(M) <  for all
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M sufficiently large. Since the expression, M
a+1
Ma−1 is strictly decreasing in a, (24) implies
that r∗(M) <  if and only if
M  + 1
(M  − 1) lnM < . (25)
Mote that, for any  > 0,
lim
M→∞
M  + 1




M  + 1







= 1× 0 = 0.
Thus, for M sufficiently large inequality (25) holds, which implies that r∗(M) <  for M
sufficiently large.
Mext we show that X∗M(r) is increasing in M , for fixed r. Let M ≥ 2 be given. Fix
0 < r < rM+1 < rM ; we show that X
∗
M+1 (r) > X
∗
M (r). To establish the result, we will
show that for all m ∈ [M,M + 1] it holds that ∂X∗m(r)
∂m






[r + 1 +mr − rmr] .
Let Γ(m) = r + 1 +mr − rnr. To establish the result, we must show Γ(m) > 0 for all
m ∈ [M,M + 1]. Mote, however, that Γ(·) is strictly decreasing, so the result follows if
Γ(M + 1) > 0. Recall the definition of rM+1:
(rM+1 − 1)(M + 1)rM+1 = 1.
Mow recall that rM+1 > 1 for any M ; so r ≤ 1 implies (M + 1)r(r − 1) ≤ 0 <
(M + 1)rM+1(rM+1 − 1). For all r > 1, the term, (M + 1)r(r − 1), is strictly increasing in
r, so 1 < r < rM+1 implies (M + 1)
r(r− 1) < (M + 1)rM+1(rM+1− 1). Thus, we have the
following:
Γ(M + 1) = r + 1− (M + 1)r(r − 1)
> r + 1− (M + 1)rM+1(rM+1 − 1)
= r + 1− 1
= r > 0
The first strict inequality follows since, as shown above, (M + 1)r(r − 1) < (M +
1)rM+1(rM+1−1). The second equality follows by the definition of rM+1. Thus, Γ(M+1) >
0.
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Proof of Proposition 2
By Lemma 6, it suffices to show that when r = 1, and M ≥ 3 equilibrium total effort
under the Tullock CSF is greater than V . Let XTM denote equilibrium total effort under
the Tullock when r = 1 and there are M periphery players. Since XTM is strictly increasing








Proof of Theorem 3
Under the APA CSF, it follows immediately from Lemmas 5 and 8 that X(g) > X(g′)
if and only if M > dp. But the link property, (4), implies that M > dp if and only if
N > dc. Under the Tullock CSF, from Lemma 4, total equilibrium effort on the hybrid
network, g′, is
X(g′) = Nx∗ + x∗N+1 =
(2N + 1− dc)N
(N + 1)2
(dpV ) =
(2N + 1− dc)dc
(N + 1)2
MV.









(2N + 1− dc)dc
(N + 1)2
,
re-arranging, (−N +Ndc − (dc)2 − 1) (N − dc + 1) > 0.
Since N ≥ dc, the inequality above is equivalent to




dc − 1 .
40
Proof of Theorem 4
For k = 1, 2 let X(gk) = Xk and x(gk) = xk. Since both networks have N players,
clearly X1 > X2 if and only if x1 > x2. First suppose the CSF is the Tullock; using the









dc2−1 , which holds
if and only if dc1 > d
c
2. Thus, (iv) is equivalent to (iii), and (iii) is equivalent to (ii).
We now show (i) is equivalent to (ii). The link property for biregular networks gives,
for each k = 1, 2: Ndpk = Mkd
c
k. Combining the link property with the assumption,












, which means dc1 > d
c
2 if and
only if dp1V1 > d
p
2V2.
Finally, by Lemma 5, under the APA CSF expected equilibrium total effort in contest
network k = 1, 2 is MkVk. Clearly, each network generates the same total effort since,
by assumption, M1V1 = M2V2. Since X1 = X2, and by assumption each network has N







Alcalde, J. and Dahm, M. (2010). Rent seeking and rent dissipation: A neutrality result.
Journal of Public Economics, 94(1-2):1–7.
Ballester, C., Armengol, A. C., and Zenou, Y. (2006). Who’s who in networks. Wanted:
The key player. Econometrica, 74(5):1403–1417.
Baye, M. R. and Hoppe, H. C. (2003). The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innova-
tion, and patent-race games. Games and Economic Behavior, 44(2):217–226.
Baye, M. R., Kovenock, D., and De Vries, C. G. (1993). Rigging the lobbying process:
An application of the all-pay auction. The American Economic Review, 83(1):289–294.
Baye, M. R., Kovenock, D., and De Vries, C. G. (1994). The solution to the tullock
rent-seeking game when R > 2: Mixed-strategy equilibria and mean dissipation rates.
Public Choice.
Baye, M. R., Kovenock, D., and de Vries, C. G. (1996). The all-pay auction with complete
information. Economic Theory, 8(2):291–305.
41
Bramoulle´, Y. and Kranton, R. (2007). Public goods in networks. Journal of Economic
Theory, 135(1):478–494.
Bramoulle´, Y. and Kranton, R. (2016). Games played on networks. In Bramoulle´, Yann,
A. G. and Rogers, B., editors, The Oxford Handbook on the Economics of Networks.
Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Bramoulle´, Y., Kranton, R., and D’Amours, M. (2014). Strategic interaction and net-
works. The American Economic Review, 104(3):898–930.
Calvo´-Armengol, A. (2004). Job contact networks. Journal of Economic Theory,
115(1):191–206.
Calvo´-Armengol, A. and Jackson, M. O. (2004). The effects of social networks on em-
ployment and inequality. The American Economic Review, 94(3):426–454.
Calvo´-Armengol, A. and Zenou, Y. (2004). Social networks and crime decisions: The role
of social structure in facilitating delinquent behavior. International Economic Review,
45(3):939–958.
Che, Y.-K. and Gale, I. (2003). Optimal design of research contests. The American
Economic Review, 93(3):646–671.
Congleton, R., Hillman, A., and Konrad, K. (2008). Forty years of rent-seeking research,
volume 1-2. Springer & Verlag, Heidelberg.
Dahm, M. (2017). All-pay auctions with extra prize: A partial exclusion principle. CeDEx
Discussion Paper No. 2017-01.
Dahm, M. and Esteve-Gonzalez, P. (2014). Affirmative action through extra prizes.
CeDEx Discussion Paper No. 2014-08.
Ewerhart, C. (2015). Mixed equilibria in Tullock contests. Economic Theory, 60(1):59–71.
Fang, H. (2002). Lottery versus all-pay auction models of lobbying. Public Choice, 112(3-
4):351–371.
Franke, J. and O¨ztu¨rk, T. (2015). Conflict networks. Journal of Public Economics,
126:104–113.
Galeotti, A., Goyal, S., Jackson, M. O., Vega-Redondo, F., and Yariv, L. (2010). Network
games. The Review of Economic Studies, 77(1):218–244.
42
Gassmann, O. and Von Zedtwitz, M. (1999). New concepts and trends in international
R&D organization. Research Policy, 28(2-3):231–250.
Goyal, S. and Joshi, S. (2003). Networks of collaboration in oligopoly. Games and Eco-
nomic Behavior, 43(1):57–85.
Goyal, S. and Moraga-Gonzalez, J. L. (2001). R&D networks. RAND Journal of Eco-
nomics, 32(4):686–707.
Grandjean, G., Tellone, D., and Vergrote, W. (2016). Cooperation, competition and entry
in a Tullock contest. CORE Discussion Paper 2016/32.
Hillman, A. L. and Riley, J. G. (1989). Politically contestable rents and transfers. Eco-
nomics & Politics, 1(1):17–39.
Jackson, M. O. (2008). Social and Economic Networks. Princeton University Press,
Princeton.
Jackson, M. O. and Yariv, L. (2007). Diffusion of behavior and equilibrium properties in
network games. The American Economic Review, 97(2):92–98.
Jackson, M. O. and Zenou, Y. (2014). Games on networks. In Young, P. and Zamir, S.,
editors, Handbook of Game Theory, volume 4. Elsevier.
Ko¨nig, M. D., Rohner, D., Thoenig, M., and Zilibotti, F. (2015). Networks in conflict:
Theory and evidence from the great war of Africa. HICN Working Paper 195.
Konrad, K. (2009). Strategy and Dynamics in Contests. Oxford University Press, New
York, NY.
Kovenock, D. and Roberson, B. (2015). The optimal defense of network connectivity.
CESifo Working Paper No. 5653.
Marinucci, M. and Vergote, W. (2011). Endogenous network formation in patent contests
and its role as a barrier to entry. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 59(4):529–551.
Matros, A. (2006). Rent-seeking with asymmetric valuations: Addition or deletion of a
player. Public Choice, 129(3-4):369–380.
Menicucci, D. (2006). Banning bidders from all-pay auctions. Economic Theory, 29(1):89–
94.
43
Nitzan, S. (1994). Modelling rent-seeking contests. European Journal of Political Econ-
omy, 10(1):41–60.
Nti, K. O. (1999). Rent-seeking with asymmetric valuations. Public Choice, 98(3-4):415–
430.
Nti, K. O. (2004). Maximum efforts in contests with asymmetric valuations. European
Journal of Political Economy, 20(4):1059–1066.
Stein, W. E. (2002). Asymmetric Rent-Seeking with More than Two Contestants. Public
Choice, 113(3-4):325–336.
Tullock, G. (1980). Efficient rent-seeking. In Buchanan, J. M., Tollison, R. D., and
Tullock, G., editors, Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society, number 4, pages 97–
112. Texas A&M University Press, College Station, Texas.
44
